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Abstract 
Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs) have been argued to be afflicted with incentive-
incompatibility problems and, indeed, they have a mixed record in their ability to curb market 
abuse. An earlier theoretical study by DeMarzo et al. (2005), however, finds that SROs, under 
the oversight of the government, may overcome these incentive-incompatibility problems and 
may deliver the same degree of oversight as the government would have delivered without the 
SRO, but against lower costs. I find that this result hinges on the assumption that the 
interaction between the SRO and the government can be characterized as a game of sequential 
moves with the SRO moving first and the government moving second. For institutional 
settings where it is more appropriate to characterize the interaction as a game of simultaneous 
moves, I obtain the inefficient result that oversight by the government fully crowds out 
oversight by the SRO. A possible remedy is suggested. 
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1. INTRODUCTION1 
Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs) can be found in not-for-profit sectors, education, 
healthcare, and the energy industry, as well as in the accounting, financial, and legal 
professions (DeMarzo et al., 2005; Hilary and Lennox, 2005; Maute, 2008; Ortmann and 
Mysliveček, 2010; Ortmann and Svitkova, 2010; Rees, 1997; Sidel, 2005; Studdert et al., 
2004; Welch, Mazur and Bretschneider, 2000). Generally, regulatory oversight by an SRO is 
considered cheaper than regulatory oversight by the government, as SROs have more 
information and are better enabled to interpret the information (DeMarzo et al., 2005). 
Examples of SROs are the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority in the securities industry 
(DeMarzo et al., 2005), the so-called Donors Forums in not-for-profit sectors in Central and 
Eastern Europe (Ortmann and Svitkova, 2010), and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 
in the nuclear power industry (Rees, 1997). 
DeMarzo et al. (2005) present an influential model of regulatory oversight by a regulator 
(which can be an SRO or the government) over an interaction between a customer (he) and an 
agent (she) using the costly-state-verification model of Townsend (1979), Border and Sobel 
(1987), and Mookherjee and Png (1989).2 In these models, the agent provides a service that is, 
on average, wealth-increasing, but can have a low or a high outcome. The outcome is private 
knowledge of the agent and an opportunistic agent may thus have an incentive to deceive a 
customer by reporting a low outcome when it is in fact high and keep the pay-off difference 
herself. The agent thus needs to be incentivized to be honest and DeMarzo et al. (2005) show 
that both a “whip” and a “carrot” may be used for this purpose. The regulator performs 
random investigations when the agent reports a low outcome and gives a financial penalty 
when the agent is found to have deceived a customer (the whip) and the customer gives the 
agent a bonus in the form of a success fee when the agent reports a high outcome (the carrot). 
The regulatory regime can thus be modeled as the probability (referred to as the "investigation 
probability") with which the regulator investigates reports of the low outcome. When 
customers and agents make contracts, they take into account the regulatory regime. DeMarzo 
et al. (2005) thus model the oversight as a two-tier problem in which the regulators (the SRO 
and the government) determine the investigation policy taking into account the effect of that 
policy on the contracts that are subsequently created by the customer and agent. The two key 
differences between the SRO and the government are investigation costs and the target group 
                                                 
1 The introduction is partly based on Van Koten and Ortmann (2013). 
2 DeMarzo et al. (2005) has been cited 87 times according to Google Scholar and 27 times according to 
Thomsons Reuters Web of Science (both accessed on 23.11.2014). 
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for which to maximize utility. Investigations done by the SRO are cheaper than those by the 
government and the target group is customers for the government and agents for the SRO.  
DeMarzo et al. (2005) show that, as investigations are costly, the profit-maximizing 
investigation probability is generally, both for the SRO and the government, smaller than 
100%. They also show that, as a result of the two key differences between the SRO and the 
government, the optimal regulatory regime of the government generally consists of a different 
(higher) investigation probability than the one of the SRO. DeMarzo et al. (2005) further 
show that, without governmental oversight, the SRO can create monopoly market power for 
their affiliated agents by setting the investigation probability very low, but that with 
governmental oversight, the SRO sets the investigation probability at the (relatively high) 
level deemed optimal by the government, thus eliminating the need for the government to do 
any investigations. In other words, the mere outside threat of governmental oversight suffices 
to have the SRO make a welfare-increasing contribution by performing oversight at a 
relatively high level against relatively low costs, rebutting earlier criticisms (e.g., Shaked and 
Sutton, 1981; Nunez 2001, 2007; Ortmann and Mysliveček, 2010). 
DeMarzo et al. (2005) obtain the results of a welfare-increasing effect of an SRO by 
modeling the interaction between the SRO and the government as a one-shot sequential game 
where the SRO moves first and the government moves second. Modeling the interaction as a 
sequential game rests on the assumption that the government, when choosing its regulatory 
regime by setting its investigation probability, already knows the regulatory regime of the 
SRO. A regulatory regime is, however, enacted over a future period – for example, over a 
period of one year – and the factually implemented regulatory regime can be different from 
the originally announced regulatory regime. Whether the factually implemented regulatory 
regime is the same as the announced one can only be verified in the end of a period after the 
fact. When the SRO is not obliged to make a true announcement, there is thus no reason to 
assume that the government, when setting its investigation probability, can know the factual 
regulatory regime of the SRO. The SRO may announce or signal its intended regulatory 
regime to the government, but I will show that, absent additional sanction mechanisms, the 
SRO has an incentive to deceive the government by signaling a high investigation probability, 
but factually implementing a lower one.3 It can therefore be argued that when the government 
chooses its investigation probability, it does not know the investigation probability of the 
                                                 
3 Additional regulatory mechanisms that enable the SRO to credibly commit to an announcement of its 
regulatory regime may change the interaction into a game of sequential moves. An example of such an additional 
regulatory mechanism will be presented in the conclusion of the paper. 
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SRO, and visa versa. The interaction between the SRO and the government is thus best 
characterized as a game of simultaneous moves. 
In this paper, I analyze the interaction of the government and the SRO as a one-shot 
simultaneous game and derive the unique Nash equilibrium under fairly general assumptions. 
To isolate and highlight the effect of the game structure, I use the same assumptions and game 
structure as in the model of DeMarzo et al. (2005) with the single exception that the game 
structure has simultaneous instead of sequential moves.4 I show that the Nash equilibrium 
outcome of the simultaneous game, in contrast with the one of the sequential game, is Pareto-
inefficient: The government does all investigations and the SRO none. The welfare-improving 
effect of the SRO in DeMarzo et al. (2005) is thus critically dependent on the assumption that 
the interaction between the SRO and the government can be characterized as a sequential 
game. The proof is presented in section 2. Section 3 presents a numeric example and section 4 
concludes with a discussion of the results and a policy-relevant implication for regulation. 
 
2. THE MODEL 
2.1 Setup 
As in DeMarzo et al. (2005), the main interaction in the model is between an SRO and the 
government (GOV). It is common knowledge that the SRO maximizes the total utility of all 
agents and the GOV maximizes the total utility of all customers. An agent (she) affiliated with 
an SRO provides a service for a customer (he), such as making an investment. The outcome 
of the investment is modeled as a random variable W that can have realizations high ( Hw ) or 
low ( Lw ) with probability H  and L , respectively. The realized outcomes are observed by 
the agent. The realized outcomes are not directly observable by the customer, but can be 
verified by the SRO or the GOV for a cost of SROc  or GOVc , respectively, where GOV SROc c . 
The regulatory environment consists of the regulatory regimes of the SRO and the GOV, 
where each of them performs, when the low outcome is reported, an investigation with 
probabilities SROp  and GOVp , respectively.
5 When the agent is found to have deceived a 
customer, she will receive a financial penalty from the SRO or the GOV in the amount of 
SROx  or GOVx , respectively. Given this regulatory environment, customers can offer a contract 
[ ]z W  that obliges the agent to return the customer [ ]Lz w ( [ ]Hz w ) when the outcome is low 
                                                 
4 The proofs of Lemmas 2a), 2c), 3a), 3b), 4b), and Proposition 2 follow those in DeMarzo et al. (2005) fairly 
closely, being adapted for a game with simultaneous moves. The proofs of Lemmas 1a), 1b), 2b), 4a), 4c), and 
4d) and Propositions 1a) and 1b) are unique to this paper. 
5 Note that the agent has no reason to be deceptive with the low realization as reporting the high realization when 
it is actually low results in a negative income. 
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(high). The contract thus implies that agents may keep a success fee, a part of the investment 
returns, equal to [ ]L Lw z w ( [ ]H Hw z w ) when the outcome is low (high). The customer 
offers the contract as a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the agent. Without loss of generality (using 
the revelation theorem), the analysis can be restricted to contracts that are incentive-
compatible and agents thus, in equilibrium, accept the contract. 
Two polar cases for the regulatory environment are of particular interest: When only the 
GOV is exerting regulatory oversight (also referred to as "GOV-only") and when only the 
SRO is exerting regulatory oversight (also referred to as "SRO-only"). DeMarzo et al. (2005) 
show that the SRO under SRO-only sets its investigation probability inefficiently low, leaving 
the “stick” in the form of financial penalties mostly ineffective as an incentive for the agent to 
report truthfully. As a result the customer is forced to use “carrots”: He must offer the agent a 
large proportion of the outcome as a success fee to incentivize her to report truthfully. When 
customers are homogeneous in their outside options, the SRO will set its investigation 
probability so low that the necessary success fee will extract all the surplus of the investment, 
thus leaving customers with an expected utility equal to their outside option. When customers 
are heterogeneous in their outside options, a low investigation probability may dissuade 
customers with high outside options from entering. The SRO therefore sets an investigation 
probability that maximizes the product of the expected fee and the number of customers that 
will participate. Customers with low outside options will now keep some of the surplus, but, 
from a welfare point of view, the resulting outcome is undesirable. 
By also exerting oversight, the GOV can affect the SRO's optimal investigation 
probability, provided the investigation cost of the GOV is not too much higher than the one of 
the SRO. Namely, as the expected investigation cost is borne by the customer, the higher the 
GOV investigation cost, the lower the optimal GOV investigation probability. For extremely 
high cost differentials between the GOV and the SRO, the investigation probability set by the 
GOV under GOV-only is lower than the investigation probability set by the SRO under SRO-
only. For such a high cost differential, oversight by the GOV in addition to oversight by the 
SRO is ineffective as it would decrease the welfare of customers and the GOV thus refrains 
from exercising oversight. As in DeMarzo et al. (2005), I assume that the cost differential is 
small enough to make oversight by the GOV effective.6 
 
 
                                                 
6 Oversight by the GOV is thus defined as effective when the GOV, under GOV-only, sets a higher investigation 
probability than the SRO under SRO-only. The effectiveness of oversight by the GOV is a necessary condition 
for the results in Proposition 1. 
Silvester Van Koten
4
  
 Prime decision 
makers 
The present model 
(Simultaneous moves) 
DeMarzo et al. (2005) 
(Sequential moves) 
Stage 
1 
SRO and GOV 
(set investigation 
probability) 
The SRO and the GOV 
simultaneously set their 
regulatory regimes by each 
choosing an investigation 
probability SROp  and GOVp , 
respectively. 
The SRO sets its regulatory 
regime by choosing the 
investigation probability SROp , 
which is observed by the GOV. 
The GOV then sets its regulatory 
regime by choosing the 
investigation probability GOVp . 
Stage 
2 
 
Customers  
(either take 
outside option or 
offer an incentive-
compatible 
contract) 
Customers offer agents, as a take-it-or-leave-it offer, an incentive-
compatible contract [ ]z W  that result in a success fee for the agent 
in the amount of [ ]L Lw z w  when the outcome is low and 
[ ]H Hw z w  when the outcome is high. Customers pay transaction 
fees SRO GOVt t . Only customers that expect a utility (net of the 
transaction fees) larger than their outside option offer agents a 
contract. Agents accept the contracts. 
Stage 
3 
Nature: 
(decide, at 
random, the 
investment 
outcome) 
With probability L  the low outcome, Lw , is realized. With 
probability H  the high outcome, Hw , is realized. The outcome 
is private knowledge of the agent. As customers offer incentive-
compatible contracts in Stage 2, agents report the outcome 
truthfully. 
Stage 
4 
Nature: 
(decide, at 
random, if the 
agent with low 
outcomes are 
investigated and 
by whom) 
First it is determined, with probability SROp , for each agent with a 
low outcome if she will be investigated by the SRO. For each 
agent the SRO investigates, the SRO pays investigation cost SROc . 
Agents that deceive pay penalty SROx .
7 
Then it is determined, with probability GOVp , for each agent with 
a low outcome that has not been investigated by the SRO if she 
will be investigated by the GOV. For each agent the GOV 
investigates, the GOV pays the investigation cost GOV SROc c . 
Agents that deceive pay penalty GOVx . 
The transaction fee SROt  ( GOVt ) has to cover the expected 
investigation cost of the SRO (GOV), net of the expected penalty 
SROx  ( GOVx ). 
TABLE 1 
Timing and order of moves 
 
The effect of the regulatory regime by the GOV depends on whether, in Stage 1 (see Table 
1), the GOV sets, as in the present model, an investigation probability at the same time as the 
SRO (a simultaneous move) or, as in DeMarzo et al. (2005), after as the SRO (a sequential 
                                                 
7 Note that, as the offers of customers in Stage 2 are assumed to be incentive-compatible, no agents deceive in 
equilibrium and therefore agents pay zero in penalties in equilibrium. 
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move). Table 1 shows the timing and order of moves, both for the present model (on the left) 
and the model of DeMarzo et al. (2005) (on the right). 
 In stage 1, the GOV and the SRO set their investigation probability simultaneously in the 
present model, while they set it sequentially in the model of DeMarzo et al. (2005). The 
remaining stages are identical for both models. 
 In stage 2, customers can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer of an incentive-compatible 
contract [ ]z W  that, when the outcome is low (high), obliges agents to return customer 
[ ]Lz w ( [ ]Hz w ) and leave agents a success fee equal to [ ]L Lw z w ( [ ]H Hw z w ). Given the 
investigation probabilities SROp  and GOVp , customers calculate the lowest success fee 
[ ]W z W  that is incentive-compatible. In addition, customers take in account the transaction 
fees SRO GOVt t  they must pay to cover the expected investigation costs of the SRO and the 
GOV. Let variable a refer to the customers’ expected utility with such a contract. The 
proportion of customers with outside options larger than a will not make an offer and take 
their outside options. The proportion of customers with outside options smaller than a will 
offer the contract to the agents, who accept the offers (as we focus on incentive-compatible 
contracts) and customers pay the transaction fees SRO GOVt t .
8 
 In stage 3, by a random move of nature, the low (high) outcome, Lw  ( Hw ), is realized 
with probability L  ( H ). The realized outcomes are private knowledge of the agents. As the 
offers of customers in Stage 2 are incentive-compatible, agents report the outcomes truthfully 
to their customer. 
 In stage 4, by a random move of nature, it is decided if the agents with low outcomes are 
investigated and by whom. Agents are first investigated by the SRO with probability SROp .
9 If 
the SRO investigates the agent, the SRO pays the investigation cost SROc  and the agent pays 
the penalty Sx  if she is found to have been deceptive. If the SRO doesn't investigate the agent, 
the GOV investigates the agent with probability GOVp . If the GOV investigates the agent, the 
GOV pays the investigation cost GOV SROc c  and the agent pays the penalty GOVx  if she is 
                                                 
8 The transaction fees are needed to cover the expected investigationl. While it may be surprising that customers 
may potentially pay a fee for the GOV and the SRO, the GOV never repeats an investigation done by the SRO, 
so wasteful duplication is avoided. Moreover, we will see that, in equilibrium, only one regulator does all 
investigations and the customer then pays a positive fee to this regulator only. 
9 This assumption could be rationalized assuming that the low outcome is reported both to the SRO and the 
GOV, but that the SRO is quicker to react than the GOV. This is not unreasonable, as governmental, 
bureaucratic organizations are often much slower than private ones. Moreover, it is rational for the GOV to move 
slower and give the SRO a chance to do the investigation first as the SRO has lower investigation costs. 
Alternatively, assuming that the GOV moves first does not change the results. 
Silvester Van Koten
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found to have been deceptive. The total probability of an investigation when the low outcome 
occurs is thus equal to S Gp p .
10 The expected investigation costs for the SRO (GOV) are 
equal to the probability of the low outcome times the probability of investigation by the SRO 
(GOV) times the cost per investigation,  SRO S O
L
Rp c  (  GOV G V
L
Op c ). The transaction fee 
SROt  ( GOVt ) has to cover the expected investigation cost of the SRO (GOV), net of the 
expected penalty SROx  ( GOVx ). Due to the focus on incentive-compatible contracts, agents 
don’t deceive and the expected penalties are equal to zero. The transaction fees are thus equal 
to the expected investigation costs, SRO SRO SRO
Lt p c    and GOV GOV GOV
Lt p c   . 
 
Utility of customers and agents 
 As in DeMarzo et al. (2005, p. 690), I assume that agents are risk averse, have zero initial 
wealth, face a limited liability constraint and have preferences that can be represented by a 
strictly concave utility function agentu  that is twice differentiable and has been normalized 
such that [0] 0agentu  . Customers are assumed to be risk neutral and can thus be modeled to 
maximize a profit function, denoted by customeru .
11 
 Following DeMarzo et al. (2005), I assume that there is a continuum of customers where a 
customer i has the outside option [ , ]ia a a  and that a cumulative distribution function [ ]F a , 
assumed to be log-concave, gives the fraction of customers with an outside option below a . 
There are at least as many (identical) agents as customers, such that for each customer i an 
agent (indexed by i) is available for dealing. The profit of the contract, a, is the same for all 
customers (it is equal to the expected value of the investment minus the expected success fee 
minus the expected investigation costs of the SRO and GOV). A customer will only offer a 
contract to an agent when the contract brings him an expected profit higher than his outside 
option. The profit of the customer is thus equal to the maximum of his outside option and the 
                                                 
10 The total probability of an investigation when the low outcome occurs is thus equal to the probability of the 
SRO investigating, SROp , plus the probability of the SRO not investigating, 1 SROp , times the conditional 
probability of the GOV investigating conditional on the SRO deciding not to investigate, 
(1 )
GOV
SRO
p
p
. This results 
in (1 )
(1 )
   

GOV
SRO SRO SRO GOV
SRO
p
p p p p
p
. See also footnote 17 in DeMarzo et al. (2005). 
11 The zero initial wealth and limited liability of agents imply that the maximum penalty on agents is bound and 
that agents cannot compete away all rents by paying customers to do business with them. The risk neutrality of 
customers abstracts from their demand for insurance in the optimal contract. See also DeMarzo et al. (2005) for 
more details. 
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profit of the contract. Let the outside option of a customer be given by ia . The profit of the 
contract, a, and the customer’s final profit, i
customeru , are given by: 
(1) ( [ ] ) [ ]SRO
L L H H
SRO GOV GOVa z w p wc p zc        
(2) [ , ]i icustomeru Max a a  
 
 The customer thus maximizes his profit i
customeru  by maximizing a as given in Equation (1) 
by choosing a contract z, respecting the restrictions that the contract must be feasible and 
incentive-compatible for the agent. Thus, the customer maximizes the consumer problem (CP) 
in Table 2. The constraint AF assures that the contract is feasible and the constraint AIC 
assures that the contract is incentive-compatible for the agent. As the offered contracts are 
incentive-compatible, agents accept the contracts and report the realized outcomes truthfully. 
 The expected utility of agent i (who is matched with a customer with outside option ia ) is 
equal to the expectation of the utility of the success fees if the utility for the customer is 
higher than his outside option and zero otherwise: 
(3) 
( [ ]) ( [ ]) if 
0 if 
L L L H H H i
i
agent i
w z w w z w a a
u
a a
        
 
  
 
 
Pay-offs of the SRO and the GOV 
 As mentioned above, the SRO has a pay-off equal to the total utility of all agents and the 
GOV has a pay-off equal to the total of profits of all customers. The pay-offs of the SRO and 
the GOV are therefore: 
(4)  [ ]  
a
SRO agent
a
u dF   
(5)  [ ]  
a
GOV customer
a
u dF   
 
The maximization problems of the SRO and the GOV can now be further analyzed in Lemma 
1. 
 
Lemma 1 
a) The maximization problem of the SRO can be solved by solving  Max [ ] [ ]a F a V a , where 
, ,[ ] Max SRO SRO SRO gez p x a ntV a u  such that 
i
customeru a  and the parameters solve CP. 
b) The maximization problem of the GOV can be solved by maximizing the customer's profit 
of the contract,  , ,Max GOV GOV GOVz p x a  such that the parameters solve CP. 
Proofs. See the Appendix. 
Silvester Van Koten
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Customer Problem ( CP[ , , , ]SRO GOV SRO GOVp p x x )  
Max [ ] [ ] ( )L L H H Lz SRO SRO GOV GOVz w z w p c p c       , s.t: 
 AF: [ ] L Lz w w , [ ] H Hz w w  
 AIC: 
 
Max [ ] ,0
[ ] Max [ ] ,0
1 [ ])
H L
SRO SRO
H H H L
GOV GOV
H L
GO
agent
agent agent
agentV SRO
p w z w x
w z w p w z w x
p p w
u
z
u
w
u
u
    
    
  
  
         
 
   
 
 

 
 
 
SRO Problem (SROP) 
Stage 1:    , ,[ ] M ]ax [ ] [SRO SRO SROz p x SR
L L
O SR
H H
O
L Hw z w wa z wV        , s.t: 
 CIC: SROz  solves CP[ , , , ]SRO GOV SRO GOVp p x x  
 CIR: [ ] [ ] ( )L L H HSRO SRO SRO SRO GOV GOVz w z w p c p c a       
Stage 2: Max [ ] [ ]a a V aF  
 
GOV Problem (GOVP) 
, ,Max [ ] [ ] ( )GOV GOV GOV
L L H H L
z p x SRO SRO GOV GOVz w z w p c p c     , s.t: 
 CIC: GOVz  solves CP[ , , , ]SRO GOV SRO GOVp p x x  
TABLE 2 
The customer, the SRO and the GOV problems 
 
 Using Lemma 1a, the SRO maximizes the SROP problem as in Table 2. In stage 1, the 
SRO maximizes [ ]V a  by choosing , ,( )SRO SRO SROz p x , respecting that the expected customer 
profits net of the fees are at least as big as a parameter a (CIR). The resulting parameters must 
also solve CP (CIC). In stage two, the SRO maximizes the product of the cumulative 
distribution of outside options times the value function, [ ] [ ]F Va a  by choosing the optimal 
level of parameter a. Using Lemma 1b, the GOV maximizes the problem GOVP as in Table 
2. The GOV maximizes the expected profit of a customer from the contract net of fees by 
choosing , ,(z )GOV GOV GOVp x . The resulting optimal parameters must also solve CP (CIC) and 
CIR. 
 Before giving a definition of the simultaneous Nash equilibrium, it is useful to first apply 
simplifications to the problems in Table 2. Lemma 2 summarizes the regularities that can be 
used for a first simplification. 
 
Lemma 2  
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a) In CP, customers offer a contract that, when the low outcome is realized, pays everything 
to customers and zero to agents, ][ L Lz w w . 
b) AF can be disregarded. 
c) AIC is binding.  
Proofs. See the Appendix. 
 
Using Lemma 2, the problems can now be written in a simpler form. The optimal contract for 
the low realization has been determined as ][ L Lz w w  (Lemma 2a). I further simplify 
notation by writing ][H Hz z w , where, when the high outcome is realized, Hz  is the money 
the agent has to return to the customer and H Hw z  is the money the agent may keep as a 
success fee. For the consumer problem (CP), constraint AF can be disregarded (using Lemma 
1b), while the solution of CP will be given by AIC (using Lemma 1c). Replacing the 
constraints CIC in the SRO problem (SROP) and the GOV problem (GOVP) by AIC makes it 
possible to further focus only on the SRO and GOV problems. The simplified set of problems 
is shown in Table 3. 
 
SRO Problem (SROP') 
Stage 1: 
, ,
[ ] Max [ ] ,   s.t.H
SRO SRO SRO
H H H
a SROz p enx g t
uV a w z      
 CIR:  L L H H LSRO SRO SRO GOV GOVw z p c p c a       
 AIC: 
 
Max[ ,0]
] Max[ ,0]
1 ]
[
[
agent
age
H L
SRO SRO
H H H L
SRO Gnt agent
agent
OV GOV
H L
GOV SRO
p w w x
w z p w
u
u u
u
w x
p p w w
   
  
      
 
   
 






 
 
Stage 2: Max [ ] [ ]a F a V a  
 
GOV Problem (GOVP') 
, ,
Max ( )H
GOV GOV GOV
L L H H L
GOV SRO SRO GOV GOVz p x
w z p c p c      
 AIC: 
 
Max[ ,0]
] Max[ ,0]
1 ]
[
[
agent
age
H L
SRO SRO
H H H L
GOV Gnt agent
agent
OV GOV
H L
GOV SRO
p w w x
w z p w w x
u
u
p w w
u
up
     
  
  
   
 

  
 



 
 
TABLE 3 
The SRO and the GOV problems in a simpler format 
 
Lemma 3 summarizes two regularities that can be used to further simplify the problem. 
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Lemma 3 
a)  Both the SRO and the GOV set, respecting the limited liability of the agents, the 
penalty at the maximum,   H LGOV SROx x w w  
b) CIR binds. 
Proofs. See the Appendix. 
 
Using Lemma 3a), the penalties are set at the maximum, H LGOV SROx x x w w    . Then the 
first two terms at right-hand side in AIC are equal to zero: [ ,0]H Lagent Max w w xu      
[ ,0]agent
H L H LMax w w wu w      0 0agentu  . Also, the contract is now endogenously 
determined in AIC by the investigation probabilities SROp  and GOVp and I therefore write the 
contract explicitly as [ , ]H SRO GOVz p p . Table 4 summarizes the problem in the most simplified 
format. 
 
SRO Problem (SROP'') 
Stage 1: [ ] Max [ , ] ,   s.t.    SRO agent
H H H
p SRO GOVV a w z p pu  
 CIR:  [ , ]   L L H H LSRO GOV SRO SRO GOV GOVw z p p p c p c a    
 AIC:  [ , ] ][1H H H Lagent agenSRO GOV GOV SRO tu w z p p p p w wu        
Stage 2: Max [ ] [ ]a F a V a , [ ] ArgMax [ ] [ ]SRO GOV aa p F a V a  
 
GOV Problem (GOVP'') 
 [ ] Max [ , ] ,   s.t.
GOV
L L H H L
GOV SRO p SRO GOV SRO SRO GOV GOVa p w z p p p c p c       
 AIC:  [ , ] ][1H H H Lagent agenSRO GOV GOV SRO tu w z p p p p w wu        
TABLE 4 
The SRO and the GOV problems in the most simplified format 
 
In Table 4, in SROP'' (GOVP''), the SRO (GOV) maximizes its pay-off by setting its 
investigation probability SROp  ( GOVp ) given the investigation probability of the GOV (SRO). 
Each organization thus maximizes the following expressions: 
(6)   Max [ , ]
SROp SRO SRO GOV
p p  
(7)   Max [ , ]
GOVp GOV SRO GOV
p p  
 
The Nash equilibrium with simultaneous moves can now be characterized as follows: 
Definition of the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous game 
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The SRO chooses an investigation probability *SROp  and the GOV chooses an investigation 
probability *GOVp  such that 
* * *[ , ] [ , ]  SRO SRO GOV SRO SRO GOVp p p p  for all [0,1]SROp  and 
* * *[ , ] [ , ]  GOV SRO GOV SRO SRO GOVp p p p  for all [0,1]GOVp . 
 
2.3 Model solution 
The Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-moves game can now be determined. Denote the 
best response functions for the SRO and the GOV, the optimal investigation probability for 
SRO (GOV) as a function of the investigation probability chosen by the GOV (SRO), as 
[ ]SRO GOVBR p  and [ ]GOV SROBR p , respectively. Note that, under SRO-only and under GOV-
only, the best response functions are [0]SROBR  and [0]GOVBR , respectively. The assumption 
that the GOV oversight is effective can thus be written with the help of the best response 
functions as [0] [0]GOV SROBR BR . Lemma 4 summarizes the main characteristics of the 
GOVP'', SROP'' and the best response functions of the SRO and the GOV. 
 
Lemma 4  
a)  [ ]V a  is strictly decreasing in a , [ ] 0V a  . 
b) Provided GOVP'' and SROP'' have solutions, they are unique. 
c) The best response function of the SRO obeys  [ ] Max 0, [0]SRO GOV SRO GOVBR p BR p  , 
with a strict inequality when [0] 0 SRO GOVBR p . 
d) The best response function of the GOV is given by 
 [ ] Max 0, [0]SRO SGOV GO ROVBR p BR p  .  
 Proofs. See the Appendix. 
 
 Thus, the best response of the SRO fulfills  [ ] MAX 0, [0]GOV GSRO SR OVOBR p BR p   and 
the best response of the GOV is given by  [ ] Max 0, [0]SRO SGOV GO ROVBR p BR p  . In other 
words, the GOV is best off when the fixed level of total oversight by the SRO and GOV 
together is equal to [0]GOVBR , and while the GOV prefers the oversight to be done by the 
SRO, the GOV is willing to provide any necessary level of oversight to make up a shortfall. 
Figure 1 shows the best response functions of the GOV (the red, solid line) and the SRO (the 
blue, dashed line). The vertical axis shows the investigation probability of the SRO and the 
horizontal axis the investigation probability of the GOV. Given Lemmas 4c) and 4d), when 
the best response function has an interior solution (thus excluding the parts where the best 
Silvester Van Koten
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response functions are either vertical or horizontal in Figure 1), it has, for the GOV, a slope of 
-1, and, for the SRO, a slope lower than -1. 
 
GOV
GOVp
SRO
SROp
[ ]
Slope 1
SRO GOVB pR
 
Slope = 1
[ ]GOV SROpBR

1. GOV-only
( [0])GOVBR
2. SRO-only
( [0])SROBR
3. Sequential NE
0 1
1
 
FIGURE 1 
Best response functions of the GOV and the SRO 
 
In Figure 1, I marked the choice by the GOV under GOV-only (point 1), the choice by the 
SRO under SRO-only (point 2) and the sequential Nash equilibrium found by DeMarzo et al. 
(2005) (point 3). In the Nash equilibrium of the sequential game, the SRO sets its 
investigation probability equal to the probability the government would have set under GOV-
only, [0]GOVBR , and the GOV sets its investigation probability equal to zero. I will now prove 
in Proposition 1 that the only Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous game is an action profile 
where the GOV does all investigations and the SRO does none (point 1 in Figure 1).  
 
Proposition 1 
a) In the unique Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous game, the GOV does all the 
investigation and the SRO does none. 
b) If, in the simultaneous game, the GOV were gullible, in the sense that the GOV 
believes any investigation probability announced by the SRO, then the SRO deceives 
the GOV by announcing an investigation probability [0]SRO GOVBRp  , while 
implementing [0] [0] SRO SRO GOVBRp BR . 
Self-Regulatory Organizations under the Shadow of Governmental Oversight: Blossom or Perish?
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 Proofs. See the Appendix. 
 
 Proposition 1a establishes that, in the unique Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous game, 
the GOV does all the investigations and the SRO does none. Note that DeMarzo et al. (2005) 
showed that this outcome is suboptimal not only from the viewpoint of the GOV, but also 
from the viewpoint of the SRO. Thus if the SRO could make an announcement before the 
setting of the investigation probabilities and commit itself credibly to this announcement, it 
would announce and implement [0]SRO GOVBRp . Proposition 1b, however, shows that the 
SRO has the incentive to make a false announcement: The SRO would announce investigation 
probability [0]SRO GOVBRp  ,but factually implement [0] [0] SRO SRO GOVBRp BR . When the 
GOV is not gullible, the GOV therefore disregards the SRO's announcement as cheap talk and 
the interaction between GOV and SRO is best characterized as one of simultaneous moves. 
As the SRO does no investigations, the investigation probability of the GOV is given by 
[0]GOV GOVBRp  . The solution has earlier been presented in DeMarzo et al. (2005)
12 and I 
present it here, for completeness, as Proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2. In the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous game, the GOV sets its 
investigation probability given by 
  ][
]
1
[agent
ag
H L L
GOVHH L
ent aG V ntO ge
w w
c
p
u
u w wu



 
   


. 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
 
                                                 
12 Proposition 6, notated as 
cgp . 
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

 
FIGURE 2 
Optimization 
 
 Figure 2 illustrates the optimization problems for the SRO and the GOV. The horizontal 
axis shows the investigation probability and the vertical axis shows the success fee H Hw z  
when the high outcome is realized. The customer's utility increases by moving in the South-
Western direction, while the agent's utility increases by moving in the Northern direction. The 
thick, red, curved, downwards sloping line is the incentive-compatibility constraint for agents 
(AIC in SROP'' and GOVP''). Any solution, both in GOVP'' and SROP'', must be on the AIC 
line to make truthful reporting incentive-compatible for the agents.  
 The thin, black, straight, downwards sloping line is the level of customer utility 
[ ]SRO GOVa p  (CIR in SROP''). More such lines could be drawn for different values of the 
customer utility. Under SRO-only, the SRO selects a level of customer utility relatively far in 
the Northern direction, as this increases the utility level of the agent. The intersection of this 
level of customer utility with the IC constraint for agents determines the optimal point under 
SRO-only, indicated by [0]SROBR  (point 1). Under GOV-only, the GOV selects the highest 
possible level of its objective function (the customer utility) that still fulfills AIC. The 
objective function of the GOV is identical to CIR in SROP'', except that is has a steeper slope, 
reflecting the fact that the costs of investigations by the GOV are more expensive than by the 
SRO. The highest level of the customers utility is determined by a tangency condition where 
the slope of the AIC with respect to GOVp (the left-hand side of the condition in Proposition 2) 
Self-Regulatory Organizations under the Shadow of Governmental Oversight: Blossom or Perish?
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is equal to 
L
GOVH
c


(the right-hand side of the condition in Proposition 2) indicated by 
[0]GOVBR  (point 2). 
 
3. EXAMPLE 
 As an example, I use the same parameters and procedures to translate the decision 
problems of the SRO and the GOV into a 3x3 matrix game as we used in Van Koten and 
Ortmann (2013). Thus, I use, for the agents, an utility function with constant relative risk-
aversion, 
1
[ ] 10
RAx
u x
RA

  , with RA=0.5, and, for the customers, the linear (and thus risk-
neutral) function, [ ]u x x . Customers have outside options that are uniformly distributed 
between 5 and 105. The uniform distribution is log-concave and thus fulfills the assumptions 
of the model. The low (high) outcome is given by 20Lw   ( 200Hw  ), and occurs with 
probability 0.75L   ( 0.25H  ). The investigation cost of the SRO (GOV) is 10Sc   
( 40Gc  ). Table 5 summarizes the parameters. 
 
Utility function customers Linear ( [ ]u x x ) 
Utility function agents 
1
[ ] 10
RAx
u x
RA

 
 
Risk Aversion agents (RA) =0.5 
Outside option UD over [5,105] 
Low investment outcome ( Lw )  =20 
High investment outcome ( Hw ) =200 
Probability low outcome ( L ) = 75% 
Probability high outcome ( H ) = 25% 
Investigation cost of SRO ( Sc ) = 10 
Investigation cost of GOV ( Gc ) = 40 
TABLE 5 
Parameter overview 
 
The optimal choices are, for the GOV under GOV-alone, [0] 0.67GBR  , and for the SRO 
under SRO-alone, [0] 0.32SBR  . As [0] 0.67 0.32 [0]G SBR BR   , the assumption that 
oversight by the GOV is effective is thus fulfilled.13 Using the values zero ("NONE"), 
[0] 0.32SBR   ("LOW") and [0] 0.67GBR   ("HIGH"), a 3x3 matrix game can be generated 
                                                 
13 A numerical simulation shows that, keeping the other parameters constant, oversight by the GOV loses its 
effectiveness once the cost of GOV reaches 81.8, thus about eight times the cost of investigation by the SRO. 
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with the payoffs for the SRO and the GOV (divided by 100) in each of the cells. Table 6 
shows the 3x3 matrix game.  
 
  GOV 
  NONE LOW HIGH 
NONE (10, 1) (14, 4) (8, 6)* 
LOW (17, 7) (10, 9) (0, 7) 
S 
R 
O HIGH (11, 13)# (0, 10) (0, 9) 
# Nash equilibrium of the sequential game (SRO moves first, GOV second) as in DeMarzo et al. (2005)  
* Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous game 
TABLE 6 
3x3 Matrix game 
 
 The matrix game illustrates the effect of changing the game from one with sequential 
moves to one with simultaneous moves. When the game is sequential, the SRO knows that, 
after it has made its choice, the GOV will choose the option that maximizes the GOV's 
profits. Thus when the SRO chooses NONE, the GOV chooses HIGH, when the SRO chooses 
LOW, the GOV chooses LOW and when the SRO chooses HIGH, the GOV chooses NONE. 
The SRO can thus choose between the outcomes for (NONE, HIGH), (LOW, LOW), and 
(HIGH, NONE). The last outcome brings the highest profit for SRO, 11. Thus, in the 
sequential game, the SRO chooses HIGH and the GOV chooses NONE. 
 When the interaction between the GOV and the SRO is simultaneous, the strategy profile 
(HIGH, NONE) is not a Nash equilibrium. When the GOV chose NONE, the SRO would 
deviate to the choice LOW (a payoff for the SRO of 17 versus 11). But when the SRO chose 
LOW, the GOV would deviate to the choice LOW (a payoff for the GOV of 9 versus 7). This 
process continues with the SRO reducing and the GOV increasing the investigation 
probability. The only strategy profile that is not dominated is the one where the SRO chooses 
none and the GOV chooses HIGH. 
 Note that the Nash equilibrium payoffs in the simultaneous game are Pareto-dominated by 
those in the sequential game. Both the SRO and the GOV would thus gain from institutional 
design changes that could change the interaction between the SRO and the GOV into one of 
sequential moves with the SRO moving first and the GOV moving second. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
  DeMarzo et al. (2005) reported that adding governmental oversight may increase the 
oversight activity of the SRO to an efficient level. This study adds an important qualification: 
When the interaction between an SRO and a government is best described as one of 
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simultaneous moves, then the oversight by the government completely crowds out the 
oversight by the SRO and the SRO becomes superfluous. This outcome is Pareto-inefficient 
as the government has a higher cost of investigation than the SRO. The result is of importance 
since many industries have been trying to rely on self-regulation. 
 DeMarzo et al. (2005) assert that the interaction between the SRO and government can be 
characterized as sequential moves as the SRO can announce its investigation probability to the 
government and so become a first mover. However, the announced investigation probability 
may be different from the investigation probability that is factually implemented. Proposition 
1b) showed that the SRO has indeed the incentive to deceive the government by announcing a 
high investigation probability but implementing a lower one. Assuming that the government is 
not gullible, the government will disregarded the SRO's announcement as an uninformative 
signal. This makes the interaction between the SRO and government one of simultaneous 
moves, resulting in the inefficient outcome as derived in this paper. 
It may be worthwhile considering what institutional design elements could transform the 
interaction between the SRO and the government into one of sequential moves. Namely, if the 
SRO could credibly commit to its announced investigation probability, then the government 
could trust the announcement and condition its choice on the announcement. This would 
transform the interaction between the SRO and the government into one of sequential moves, 
resulting in the efficient outcome as derived in DeMarzo et al. (2005). As the inefficient 
outcome is also suboptimal from the viewpoint of the SRO, the SRO could be expected to 
actively promote implementing institutional design changes that enable the SRO to credibly 
commit to its announcement. 
An example of a design element that could make the announcement of the SRO credible is 
the addition of another tier of regulation. This could be a relatively light-handed form of 
regulation, focused on forcing the SRO to make a clear and precise regulatory regime 
announcement and to implement its announced regulatory regime. For example, the 
government could oversee the SRO, require it to announce an regulatory regime in the form 
of a precise numeric investigation probability, monitor the proportion of complaints that are 
investigated by the SRO and severely sanction the SRO when it underperforms. 
 
Appendix 
Lemma 1 
a) The maximization problem of the SRO can be solved by solving  [ ] [ ]aMax F a V a , where 
, ,[ ] SRO SRO SROz p x agentV a Max u  such that 
i
customeru a  and the parameters solve CP. 
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Proof.  In stage 1, the SRO chooses the parameters , ,SRO SRO SROz p x  to maximize the 
restricted agent utility,  , , ;SRO Sagent RO SROz p xu a , respecting the restriction that the parameters 
also solve CP. The optimal values of the parameters are thus functions of a. Let us use the 
notation , , )( SRO SRO SROz p xv 

, ,[ ] ( [ ] , )[ ] [ ]SRO SRO SROz p xv a a a a

 and [ ; ]

agentu v a . Then: 
[ ] ] s.[ t.  iv agent customerV a Max u u a  
[ ] ( [ ] [ ] [ ] ] s.t, ) ., [ iSRO SRO SRO v agent customerv a z a a a ArgMax u u ap x  

 and that the parameters 
solve CP. 
 
[ ]V a  can thus also be written as: 
 [ ] [ ];

agentV a u v a a  
 
And the SRO’s pay-off can be written as: 
[ ] [ [ ]; ]  
 
SRO SROv v a a  
  [ [ ]; ] [ ] 
a
agent
a
u v a a dF    using (4) 
  [ ] [ ] 
a
a
V a dF     using (3) 
(A1)  [ ] [ ] 0 [ ]  
a a
a a
V a dF dF   
  [ ] [ ] 
a
a
V a dF   
(A2)  [ ] 1 [ ] 
a
a
V a dF   
  [ ] [ ]V a F a     using [ ] 0F a  
 
Equation (A1) is obtained using the fact that customers, if their outside option is larger than 
a , will not deal with the agent, resulting in zero income for the agent. Equation (A2) is 
obtained using that the optimal conditional agent utility is the same for all customers with an 
outside option lower than a  and [ ]V a  can thus be taken outside of the integration. As a result: 
   [ ] [ ] [ ] 

v SRO aMax v Max V a F a , where , , ,[ ] s.t. [ ]SRO SRO SRO SRO
i
agentz p x customet rV a Max u u a   
and that the parameters solve CP. 
 
b) The maximization problem of the GOV can be solved by maximizing the customer's profit 
of the contract,  , ,GOV GOV GOVz p xMax a , such that the parameters solve CP. 
Proof  Reminding that ,   
i i
customeru Max a a , with a being the expected customer profit 
net of the success fees and the expected investigation costs, 
 [ ] ( [ ])L L L H H HSRO SRO GOV GOGOV GOVVa w z w p wzc p c w         . The pay-off of the GOV is 
thus given by: 
[ ]
[ , [ ]
[ ] [ ]
( ) [ ] [
]
]
a
GOV customer
a
a
a
a a
a a
a a
a a
u dF
Max a dF
adF dF
a dF dF

 
  
   
 

 
  


 
 
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The second term in the resulting equation is now a constant and the GOV thus maximizes its 
pay-off by maximizing a, the customer's profit of the contract with the agent. 
 
 
Lemma 214 
a)  In CP, customers offer a contract that, when the low outcome is realized, pays everything 
to customers and zero to agents, ][ L Lz w w . 
Proof. Suppose that customers choose a contract ][ L Lz w w . Then a contract z  with 
[ ] L Lz w w and ] ][ [ H Hz w z w  would satisfy AF and AIC and would increase the 
objective function of CP by increasing the pay-off when the low outcome is realized. 
Thus, a contract [ ]L Lz w w  cannot solve the customer problem and therefore, 
][ L Lz w w . 
 
b)  AF can be disregarded. 
Proof. As Lemma 2a) established that ][ L Lz w w , the restriction AF would be 
violated only when ][ H Hz w w . However, in such case the restriction AIC would be 
violated, as the left-hand side of AIC, ][agent
H Hu w z w   , would become negative while 
the right-hand side would be positive. Thus, as long as AIC is obeyed, AF is never 
violated. Thus AF can be disregarded in the further analysis. 
 
c) AIC is binding.  
Proof. Lemma 2a) established that ][ L Lz w w . Suppose there is a contract z  that 
solves CP while AIC is not binding: 
 
 
[ ,0]
] [ ,0]
1
[
[ ]
agent
agent agent
H L
SRO SRO
H H H L
GOV GOV
agen
H L
GOV SRO t
p Max w w x
w p Max w
u
u z w u w x
p p wu w
  
    
   
    
 
        
 
  
 
     
Then there exist a new contract z  with [ ] [ ] H Hz w z w  such that  
 
 
[ ,0]
[ ] [
[
,0]
1 ]
agent
agent agen
H L
SRO SRO
H H H L
GOV GOV
H L
t
GOV SRO agent
p Max w w x
w z w p Max w w x
p p w
u
u u
wu
  
      
   
  
     
 
    
 
 
 
 
The new contract z  thus satisfies AIC and AF and strictly increases the value of the 
objective function. This is a contradiction with the assumption that contract z  solved CP. 
Thus AIC is binding.  
 
 
Lemma 315 
a)  Both the SRO and the GOV set, respecting the limited liability of the agents, the penalty at 
the maximum thus   H LGOV SROx x w w  
                                                 
14 The proofs for Lemma 2a) and 2c) follow largely the lines of the proofs in DeMarzo et a. (2005, p.703). 
15 The proofs for Lemma 3 follow mostly the lines of the proof in DeMarzo et all. (2005, p.703-704). 
Silvester Van Koten
20
  
Proof. First I will prove that the SRO sets the penalty at the maximum, 
 H LSROx w w . Suppose there is a set  , ,HSRO SRO SROz p x  that solves SROP' with 
 H LSROx w w . The set thus maximizes the objective function and satisfies CIR and AIC. 
Consider  , ,HSRO SRO SROz p x  with H LSRO SROx w w x    : Then there exists a lower 
investigation probability  SRO SROp p , such that AIC is satisfied. This leaves AIC 
unchanged, but relaxes CIR, thus allowing the objective function to reach a higher 
maximum. This leads to a contradiction with the assumption that the set  , ,HSRO SRO SROz p x  
solves SROP'. Thus  H LSROx w w . 
Now I will prove that the GOV sets the penalty at the maximum, [ , ]  L H H LGOVx w w w w . 
Suppose there is a set  , ,HSRO GOV GOVz p x  that solves GOVP' with  H LGOVx w w . The set 
thus maximizes the objective function and satisfies AIC and AF. Consider 
 , ,HGOV GOV GOVz p x  with H LGOV GOVx w w x    : Then there exists and a lower 
investigation probability  GOV GOVp p  such that AIC is satisfied. This increases the 
objective function to reach a higher maximum. This leads to a contradiction with the 
assumption that the set  , ,HGOV GOV GOVz p x  solves the GOV problem. Thus 
 H LGOVx w w . 
 
b) CIR binds. 
Proof. Suppose there is a set  ,HSRO SROz p  that solves SROP' and 
 L L H H LSRO SRO SRO GOV GOVw z p c p c a      , then there exist 
H H
SRO SROz z  and 
 SRO SROp p  such that  
L L H H L
SRO SRO SRO GOV GOVw z p c p c a        and the constraint 
AIC still holds. The objective function would thus be higher with the set  ,HSRO SROz p  . 
This leads to a contradiction with the assumption that the set  ,HSRO SROz p  solves SROP'. 
For a set solving SROP':  L L H H LSRO SRO SRO GOV GOVw z p c p c a      . 
 
 
Lemma 416 
a)  [ ]V a  is strictly decreasing in a , [ ] 0 V a . 
Proof. The SRO maximizes in stage 1 of SROP'' its value function by choosing, 
respecting constraints CIR and AIC, its optimal investigation probability *SROp . Thus  
(A3) *[ ,] H H H SROage t SROnV a u w z p p          
 
 Using CIR to express the contract gives 
  * *,L L H H LSRO SRO SRO SRO GOV GOV aw z p p p c p c         
(A4)    * *1,H L L LSRO SRO SRO SRO GOV GOVHz p p a w p c p c        
 
                                                 
16 The proof for Lemma 4b) follows mostly the lines of the proofs in DeMarzo et al. (2005, p.706). 
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 Using Equation (A4) to substitute for the contract in Equation (A3) gives 
   *[ 1] H H L L L SRO SRO GOV GOVHagent w a w p pV u c ca       
 
   
 
 
 Differentiating with respect to the customer utility level a , using envelope theorem, gives 
   *[ ] 01H L L L SRO SRO GOV GOVHagenta w a w p cV cu p 
     


    
 
 
b) Provided GOVP'' and SROP'' have solutions, they are unique. 
Proof. GOVP'' is a concave problem and thus the solution, provided it exists, will be 
unique. Also, if [ ] [ ]F a V a  is concave, [ ] [ ]F a V a  has a unique interior solution and thus 
SROP'' has a unique solution. The remainder of the proof establishes the concavity of 
[ ] [ ]F a V a . 
The concavity of [ ] [ ]F a V a  can be derived by showing that [ ]V a  can be written as 
  1 2[ ] [ ]   V a k k a W V a  with 1k  and 2k  constants and W an increasing, convex 
function. Then I can show that   0 V a , which, together with the fact from Lemma 4a), 
  0 V a , gives that [ ]V a  is concave. Together with the assumption that [ ]F a  is log-
concave, it follows that [ ] [ ]F a V a  is concave. 
 When the SRO chooses the optimal investigation probability, the first stage of SROP'', 
given a parameter a  and the investigation probability of the GOV, GOVp , consists of three 
equations: 
 
Use (A5) to substitute in (A7) gives 
 
Rewrite (A5) as 
 
Rewrite (A6) as 
 
Using (A6') to substitute for *Sp  in (A7') gives 
(A5)  [ ] [ ]  ag
H H
ent
HV a w zu  
(A6) *( )   L L H H L SRO SRO GOV GOVa w z p c p c   , 
(A7) *[ ] (1 ) [ ]H H H LSROagent agenGOV tu uw z p p w w      
(A7') *[ ] (1 ) [ ]    H H LSRO G agentOVV a p p u w w  
(A5') 1
[ ]      
agent
H H
H
V a
z w u

 
(A6') *
1
( )   L L H H GOV GOVSRO L
SRO SRO
p c
p w z a
c c
 

 
(A7'') 
1
[ ] 1 ( ) [ ]
 
        
 
H L L H H H LGOV GOV
GOVL
SR
agent
O SRO
p c
V a w z a p w w
c
u
c
  

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Using (A5') to substitute for Hz  in (A7'') gives 
 
Where: 1 [ ] 1 1

    
 

  
 
H L H GOV
agent GOV
SRO
c
k u w w p
c
 , 2
1
[ ] H L Hagent L
SRO
k u w w
c


,  
and   1
[ ]
[ ] 
 
 
 
    

 
ag
H
nt He
L L H Vu
a
W V a w w 

 and thus 1[ ] 0
      
agent H
uW

 and 
1[ ] 0
    

 
ag Hent
W u

 as agentu  is a strictly concave utility function.  W   is thus 
strictly increasing and convex. 
 
Differentiating (A8) with respect to a, using envelope theorem, gives: 
 
Differentiating (A9) with respect to a, using envelope theorem, gives: 
 
[ ]V a  is negative as the denominator is larger than zero, [ ] 0W    , and, by Lemma 4a), 
[ ] 0 V a . Thus, as [ ] 0 V a  and [ ] 0 V a , [ ]V a  is strictly concave. 
 
c) The best response function of the SRO obeys  [ ] MAX 0, [0]SRO GOV SRO GOVBR p BR p  , 
with a strict inequality for [0] 0 SRO GOVBR p . 
 Proof.  Let 0GOVp  be given. The optimal choice of the SRO is either an 
investigation probability 0SROp  or 0SROp . In the case 0SROp , write 
Total
SROp  as the 
total investigation probability of the SRO and the GOV together. As 0SROp , the SRO 
can affect TotalSROp  as 1

 
Total
SRO SRO GOV
SRO SRO
dp dp p
dp dp
. AIC in SROP'' can now be rewritten as 
 [ ] 1 ][H H Total H LSROagent agentw z p wu u w     . The term   L SRO SRO GOV GOVp c p c  in 
CIR in SROP'' can be rewritten as follows: 
 
1
1
1 [ ]
[ ] 1 ( ) [ ]
[ ]
[ ] [ ] 1 1


   
             
 
 
 
 
  


 
    
     
 
H L L H H H LGOV GOV
GOV agentL H
SRO SRO
L L H H
H
H L H GOV
agent GOV L
SRO SRO
agent
agent
V a p c
V a w w a p u w w
c c
V
a w w
c
V a u w w p
c c
u
u
  
 

 



 
(A8)   1 2[ ] [ ]    V a k k a W V a  
   2[ ] 1 [ ] [ ]   V a k V a W V a  
(A9) 
 
2
2
[ ]
1 [ ]


 

k
V a
k W V a
 
 
  
2
2
[ ] [ ]
[ ] 0
1 [ ]



 
 
k V a W V a
V a
kW V a
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    ( ) ( )      L LSRO SRO GOV GOV SRO GOV SRO GOV GOV SROp c p c p p c p c c 
 ( )   L TotalSRO SRO GOV GOV SROp c p c c
  L TotalSRO SROp c K  
where ( ) L GOV GOV SROK p c c  is regarded by the SRO as a constant. Further, let 
  a a K , then SROP'' can be reformulated as SROP''': 
SROP''' 
Stage 1: [ ] max [ ]     TotalSRO
H H H Total
agent SROp
V a u w z p , s.t: 
 CIR: [ ]   L L H H Total L TotalSRO SRO SROw z p p c a    
 AIC:  [ ] 1 [ ]    H H Total H Lagent SRO agentu w z p w wu  
Stage 2: max [ ] [ ]  a F a V a , ArgMax [ ] [ ]  SRO aa F a V a  
 
SROP''' has an identical formal setup as SROP'' under SRO-only, except that the value 
function [ ]V a  has been horizontally shifted to the left by K relative to the original [ ]V a , 
and it thus follows that the SRO will choose an optimal total investigation probability that 
will be smaller than the optimal investigation probability under SRO-only, 
[0]TotalSRO SROp BR . As [0]  
Total
SRO GOV SRO SROp p p BR , thus [0] SRO SRO GOVp BR p . The 
best response function of the SRO is thus  [ ] MAX 0, [0]SRO GOV SRO GOVBR p BR p  . 
d)  The best response function of the GOV is given by 
 [ ] MAX 0, [0]GOV SRO GOV SROBR p BR p  . 
 Proof.  Let 0SROp  be given. The optimal choice of the GOV is either an 
investigation probability 0GOVp  or 0GOVp . In the case 0GOVp , write 
Total
GOVp  as the 
total investigation probability of the SRO and the GOV together. As 0GOVp , the GOV 
can affect TotalGOVp  as 1

 
Total
GOV SRO GOV
GOV GOV
dp dp p
dp dp
. AIC in GOVP'' can now be rewritten as 
 [ ] 1 ][H H Total H LGOVagent agentw z p wu u w     . The term   L SRO SRO GOV GOVp c p c  in the 
objective function can be rewritten as follows: 
    ( ) ( )      L LSRO SRO GOV GOV SRO SRO GOV SRO GOV GOVp c p c p c c p p c 
 ( )    L TotalSRO GOV SRO G GOVp c c p c
  L TotalGOV GOVp c K  
 Where ( ) L SRO GOV SROK p c c  is regarded by the GOV as a constant. Further, let 
  a a K , then GOVP'' can be reformulated as GOVP''': 
Government Problem (GOVP3) 
Max [ ]     GOV
L L H H Total L Total
GOV p GOV GOV GOVa w z p p c K    
AIC:   [ ] 1 ][agentH H Total Total H Lagent GOV GOVu w z p p w wu       
 
Where ( ) SRO SRO GOVK p c c  is a constant 
 
GOVP3 has an identical formal setup as GOVP'' under GOV-only, except that the 
objective function has been increased by the constant K. As adding a constant to an 
objective function does not change the optimal choice, the GOV will set the total 
investigation probability equal to the optimal investigation probability under GOV-only, 
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[0]TotalGOV GOVp BR . Thus, as [0]  
Total
GOV SRO GOV GOVp p p BR , it follows that the best 
response function for the GOV is given by [ ] MAX[0, [0] ] GOV SRO GOV SROBR p BR p . 
 
Proposition 1 
a) In the unique Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous game, the GOV does all the 
investigation and the SRO does none. 
Proof.   Consider investigation probabilities ( , )RO VS GOp p  such that 
0 [0]GOV GOVBRp  . Lemma 3c) shows that SROp  can be part of a Nash equilibrium only 
if [0] [0]   GOV GOVS GOVRO SROBp R pR Bp  (as [0] [0] GOSR VOBR BR  by assumption). 
The investigation probability of the GOV and the SRO combined must thus be smaller 
than [0]GOVBR . But Lemma 3b) then implies that GOVp  will be dominated for the GOV by 
a GOVp such that [0]   GOV GOV SRO GOVp pBR p . Thus any action profile with the GOV 
choosing [0]GOV GOVBRp  cannot be a Nash equilibrium. Now consider investigation 
probabilities ( , )RO VS GOp p  such that [0]GOV GOVBRp  and 0SROp . Obviously, the 
investigation probability of the GOV is not dominated as the GOV chooses its optimal 
action. Suppose that there is a SRO SROp p  that strictly dominates 0SROp . Using Lemma 
3c) implies that then  MAX 0, [0]SRO GOSRO VBRp p    MAX 0, [0] [0]GS OVBR BR  . 
Using the assumption that the oversight by the GOV is effective, [0] [0] GOSR VOBR BR , it 
follows that 0  SRO SROp p , leading to a contradiction. Thus 0SROp  is the best, unique 
response of the SRO. The action profile where the GOV does all the investigation and the 
SRO does none is thus an unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. 
 
b) If, in the simultaneous game, the GOV were gullible, in the sense that the GOV believes 
any investigation probability announced by the SRO, then the SRO deceives the GOV by 
announcing an investigation probability [0]SRO GOVBRp  , while implementing 
[0] [0] SRO SRO GOVBRp BR . 
Proof.  If the SRO were unable to make false announcements, then the announcement 
by the SRO would be credible and the outcome as determined by DeMarzo et al. (2005) 
would result. The SRO would announce and implement [0]SRO GOVBRp  and the GOV 
would implement  [0] 0 GOV GOV GOVBR BRp . When the GOV is gullible, the SRO is 
able to make false announcements, and knows the GOV is gullible, the SRO can obtain a 
higher pay-off by making a false announcement. By announcing [0]SRO GOVBRp , the 
SRO knows the gullible GOV will set an investigation probability of 0GOVp . The best 
reply of the SRO to 0GOVp  is [0] [0] SRO SRO GOVBRp BR . This is the best strategy for 
the SRO.  
  The SRO will not announce a lower probability, [0]SRO GOVBRp , as then the GOV 
will set a strictly positive investigation probability, which makes CIR more binding in 
SROP'' as the investigation cost of the GOV are higher than those of the SRO. The SRO 
thus announces [0]SRO GOVBRp   and implements the lower investigation probability 
[0] [0] SRO SRO GOVBRp BR . 
 
Proposition 2. 17 
                                                 
17 The proof for Proposition 2 follows mostly the lines of the proof in DeMarzo et all. (2005, p. 694). 
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In the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous game, the GOV sets its investigation 
probability given by 
  ][
]
1
[agent
ag
H L L
GOVHH L
ent aG V ntO ge
w w
c
p
u
u w wu



 
   


. 
Proof. Use AIC to reformulate 
 
 1
[ , ] 1 ]
[ ]
[
[1 ]
agent ag
H H H L
entS
agent age
RO GOV GOV SRO
H H H L
GOV GO nV t
w z p p p p w w
z p w p w w
u u
u u
      
      


 
 
Substitute for the contract in the objective function 
  1 [Max 1 ] ( )
GOV agent age
L L H H H
nt
L L
p GOV SRO SRO GOV GOVw w p w w p c p cu u  
           
 
The first order condition is then 
  ][
]
1
[agent
ag
H L L
GOVHH L
ent aG V ntO ge
w w
c
p
u
u w wu



 
   


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